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SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/MAG JAMES FLOWERS DEPT FOR AF/RSA DAN EPSTEIN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/07/2018

TAGS: PREL MARR AG ML

SUBJECT: TRIPARTITE MEETING ON ALGIERS ACCORD IMPLEMENTATION

REF: STATE 71472

Classified By: Ambassador Terence P. McCulley for reasons $1.4\ (b)$ and (d)

- 1.(C) Ambassador spoke July 3 with Algerian Ambassador to Mali Abdelkarim Gheraib regarding the proposal in reftel. Ambassador underlined US support for standing up mixed special units to contribute to security in Mali's far north, but noted that the Malian leadership was cautious about providing training and equipment to groups that had mounted active rebellion against the government. The Algerian Ambassador concurred, but noted that Algeria believed the special units to be a critical element to secure buy-in from the leadership of the Tuareg rebels to returning to the framework of the Algiers Accords. Ambassador Gheraib understood the US position regarding the organization of a tripartite meeting, and said he would advise his government to issue invitations to the United States and Mali. He welcomed further discussion with the US on security issues in the Sahel.
- 2.(C) Comment: While it is useful to work with Algeria on security in northern Mali, we need to be extremely careful about adopting the Algerian vision for the special units. Ambassador Gheraib understands that the special units must perforce be mixed contingents, firmly integrated into Mali's national security forces, but -- viewed from Bamako -- it seems that other elements of the Algerian government see the units as all-Tuareg forces that could be deployed as surrogates against AQIM. The Malian leadership is deeply skeptical of this latter vision, and in a farewell call on July 3 with the Ambassador (septel), President Toure expressed concern about the "multiple desertions" by Tuareg rebels such as Hassan Fagaga (the commander of the first special unit Mali established following the conclusion of the Algiers Accords). The Malians can likely be persuaded to engage with us on the creation of the special units, but they will not agree to a force outside the command and control of the army or national guard, and they will insist that the units have both Tuareg and southern Malian members. **LEONARD**